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Introduction
On any given day, during economic busts and
economic booms alike, millions of Americans
are unable to find desirable employment de-
spite their best efforts. Understanding the rea-
sons for this fact is a chief concern for econo-
mists and policymakers, since it is necessary for
designing good labor market policies. Unem-
ployment not only creates hardships for those it
encompasses, but it also seems to represent a
vast pool of idle economic resources.
Classical labor theory is not well suited to
thinking about unemployment, for within this
framework the amount of labor that workers
supply is exactly equal to the amount of labor
demanded by firms at the equilibrium wage—
therefore, there is no unemployment. This fea-
ture of classical theory has contributed to the
historical interpretation of unemployment, or at
least a portion of unemployment, as a disequi-
librium or an involuntary phenomena. While
such terminology has permeated discussions of
unemployment, it has done little to enhance
our understanding of the underlying determi-
nants of unemployment or its behavior through
time and across countries.1
A different approach to the study of unem-
ployment, which sought to directly explain the
frequency and duration of unemployment
spells, took root during the 1970s. The building
block of this approach is the simple observa-
tion that finding a good job (or a good worker,
in the case of a firm) is an uncertain process
which requires both time and financial
resources. This assumption stands in contrast to
the classical model, in which workers and firms
are assumed to have full information at no cost
about job opportunities and workers. The alter-
native approach, referred to as the search the-
ory of unemployment, seeks to understand
unemployment in the context of a model in
which the optimizing behavior of workers and
firms gives rise to an equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment. Furthermore, it has the potential to
explain the striking fact that while millions of
workers are unemployed, firms are simultane-
ously looking to fill millions of jobs.
n 1 See Rogerson (1997) for an excellent discussion of the language
used to discuss unemployment.
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ing unemployment flourished during the 1980s
and 1990s. Incorporating the simple observa-
tion that searching is costly into a theory of
labor markets has resulted in a rich set of mod-
els which have helped us not only to under-
stand how unemployment responds to various
policies and regulations, but also to gain a bet-
ter understanding of other labor market issues
including job creation and destruction, business
cycle characteristics, and the effects of labor
market policies on the aggregate economy
more generally.
Unfortunately, while economists have found
modern search theory an invaluable tool for
understanding unemployment (as well as
numerous other issues), the insights provided
by this approach remain largely unfamiliar to
noneconomists. This is partly a reflection of the
old language of unemployment—terminology
such as “full employment’’ and the “natural rate
of unemployment’’—continuing to dominate
discussions of unemployment in the media and
politics. This review is an attempt to reach out
to those readers who are interested in acquiring
a modern perspective on unemployment by
providing an introduction to the search theory
of unemployment.
In this article I present a model of job search
and analyze how an unemployed worker’s
decision environment affects not only her
employment decisions, but also the overall
level of unemployment.2  The model focuses
on an unemployed worker’s decision to accept
an offered job or to continue searching for a
better job. This is one of the earliest search
models used in labor market analysis; its virtue
is that it provides a simple framework capturing
many of the central ideas upon which labor
search theory is based, as well as interesting
economic insights. Far richer models which
capture many additional characteristics of labor
markets have been developed, but these mod-
els are much more complex and will not be
discussed here.
I. A Model 
of Job Search
Consider an unemployed worker who is search-
ing for a job by visiting area firms, looking
through help wanted ads, etc. Although the
worker likely has many job opportunities, she
has incomplete information as to the location of
her best opportunities. Hence, she must spend
time and resources searching, and she must
hope she has luck finding one of her better
3
opportunities quickly. In any given week the
worker may receive a job offer at some wage w.
The decision she faces is whether to accept that
offer and forego the possibility of finding a bet-
ter job, or to continue searching and hope that
she is fortunate enough to get a better offer in
the near future.
This scenario is captured in a model of job
search using the following assumptions. First,
each week the worker receives one wage offer.
In order to capture the uncertainty of job offers,
I assume that this offer is drawn at random
from an urn containing wage offers between w
and w. Draws from this urn are independent
from week to week, so the size of next week’s
offer is not influenced by the size of this week’s
offer. While I will interpret draws as weekly
wage rates, they can be thought of more gener-
ally as capturing the total desirability of a job,
which could depend on hours, location, pres-
tige, and so on. For simplicity, assume that all
jobs require the same number of hours and are
of the same overall quality, so that jobs differ
only in terms of the wage.
Each week the unemployed worker must
decide whether to accept the wage offer w, or
to reject the offer and wait for a better one. If
she rejects the offer, the worker receives unem-
ployment income of wu dollars and draws a
new wage offer the following week. For sim-
plicity, wage offers from previous weeks can-
not be recalled and accepted, an assumption
which has no impact on the worker’s decision
to accept or reject this week’s offer. While I will
interpret unemployment income wu as being
unemployment compensation, it may also
include factors such as the pecuniary value of
leisure and home production activities less the
cost of searching.
If the worker accepts the wage offer, she
continues to work at that wage until she is
fired (assume that the worker cannot search
for a better job during this time). An employed
worker faces a constant probability a of being
fired at the end of each week. When an em-
ployed worker is fired, she becomes unem-
ployed and begins searching for a new job the
following week. Because an employed worker
would never choose to quit her job in this
model, I have omitted that possibility. Workers
in the model are either employed or unem-
ployed and actively searching for employment.
No worker is out of the labor force (that is, not
seeking employment).
n 2 The presentation of the model in this paper was largely drawn
from chapter 2 of Sargent (1987), which provides a more advanced
overview of search theory. Insights into the model were also drawn from
lecture notes provided by Randy Wright.
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Workers seek to maximize the expected pre-
sent value of their lifetime wage income, which
is written as 
(1) E å btyt, 
where b is a discount factor between 0 and 1,
and yt denotes the worker’s income in period
t.3 Note that (yt = wu) if the worker is unem-
ployed, and (yt = w) if the worker is employed
at wage w. The factor b determines the rate at
which workers discount their future earnings
and can also be written as 1/( 1 + r), where r
is a real rate of interest. While workers in the
model have the good fortune of living forever,
this assumption can be thought of as an ap-
proximation of the case where workers have
many periods left to live.
Now consider the unemployed worker’s
decision problem in more detail. In evaluating 
a wage offer w, her decision will depend on
how the current offer compares to other offers
which she may receive. If the chances of re-
ceiving a substantially better offer next period
are good, then the worker may choose to reject
the current offer with the expectation of receiv-
ing a better one in the near future. A worker
who rejects an offer foregoes income this week
in the amount of the offer wage w, less the
amount of unemployment compensation wu.
That loss must be balanced against the potential
gain from receiving a higher wage offer next
week, which the worker would receive in all
future weeks until she is fired. In other words,
the worker must compare the expected present
value of her income if she rejects the offer with
the expected present value of her income if 
she accepts the wage offer. As we will see, 
just how high the wage offer must be for the
worker to accept depends on the exact shape
of the wage offer distribution, the probability 
of being fired, the level of unemployment
compensation, and the rate at which the
worker discounts future earnings.
The specific mathematical structure of an
unemployed worker’s decision problem is laid
out in the appendix, along with the description
of a solution strategy. While the formulation of
this problem makes use of mathematical tech-
niques that are likely to be unfamiliar to non-
economists, the underlying intuition of the
problem is relatively straightforward and will 
be highlighted here. Recall that in making her
decision, the unemployed worker must com-
pare the expected lifetime incomes of accepting
or rejecting a particular offer. I describe the
unemployed worker’s decision problem using
the following notation. Let v wait(w) be the
expected present value of lifetime income if
she rejects a wage offer w and waits for a bet-
ter offer; let v accept(w) be the expected present
value of lifetime income if she accepts w; and
let voffer(w) be the expected present value of
lifetime income upon drawing a wage offer w.
Each of these three functions assumes that the
unemployed worker will behave optimally
(that is, makes the best decisions) in future
periods so as to maximize expected lifetime
income as given by (1).
First consider the value of rejecting an offer
and waiting for a better offer: 
(2) v wait(w) = wu + bEvoffer,
where Evoffer is the expected value of voffer(w).
The value of waiting includes the unemploy-
ment compensation which the worker receives
this week, plus the discounted expected value
of drawing a new wage offer next week. Notice
that v wait(w) is a constant, which I will write as
v wait, since Evoffer does not vary with w. This re-
flects the fact that next week’s wage offer is in-
dependent of this week’s offer, so the value of
rejecting an offer and waiting for a new offer is
the same regardless of this week’s offer.
Next consider the value of accepting a wage
offer w:
(3) vaccept(w) = 
w + baEvoffer + b (1 – a)vaccept(w).
If the worker accepts a wage offer w, she
receives income w this week. At the end of the
week she is fired with probability a, in which
case she receives the discounted expected
value of receiving a new offer next week,
bEvoffer, or she continues on the job with prob-
ability (1 – a), in which case she receives the
discounted value of accepting the same wage
offer next week, bv accept(w). This equation can
be rewritten 
(4) vaccept(w) = 
w + b a Evoffer 




n 3 The assumption that workers maximize expected lifetime income
can be interpreted in several ways: 1) workers are risk-neutral, so they do
not care about smoothing consumption; 2) workers are able to perfectly
insure themselves against any idiosyncratic income risk, so the worker first
maximizes expected income and then arranges her consumption stream so
as to maximize utility; or 3) cand w can be reinterpreted as being the utility
value of being unemployed and of working at a job with wage w respec-
tively, in which case equation (1) can be reinterpreted as expected, dis-
counted utility.
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Notice that vaccept(w) increases linearly with w.
The problem for a worker with an offer w in
hand is deciding whether to accept the offer,
which has value v accept, or reject the offer,
which has value v wait. The value of having an
offer w in hand is given by 
(5) v offer(w) = max {vaccept(w), v wait},
which takes into account that offers will be
accepted only when accepting is more benefi-
cial than waiting.
A solution to this problem is characterized
by functions v offer(w) and v accept(w), and a con-
stant v wait, that satisfy equations (2), (4), and
(5). Associated with the function voffer (w) is a
decision rule which indicates whether the
worker accepts or rejects each wage offer w
between w and w. Unfortunately, computing
these functions is not as straightforward as it
might first appear. The function vaccept(w) and
the constant v wait which define voffer (w)
depend themselves on voffer (w) through the
term Evoffer. None of these elements can be
solved for independently.
To gain insight into the nature of the solu-
tion to the unemployed worker’s job decision,
it is helpful to graph v accept(w) and v wait against
the value of the wage offer w (figure 1). The
decision to accept or reject each wage offer w
depends on whether v wait is greater than or less
than vaccept(w). The figure shows that this deci-
sion takes a particularly simple form. For values
of w less than wr, v wait is greater than
vaccept(w), so the worker is better off rejecting
the offer. For w greater than wr, v wait is less
than vaccept(w), so the worker is better off ac-
cepting the offer. The function voffer(w) is de-
fined by the maximum of these two functions,
and is illustrated in blue. Notice that wr will
depend on the specific value of v wait and the
function vaccept(w), which themselves depend
on voffer (w) through the term Evoffer. Further-
more, Evoffer depends on the value of wr, and it
will be helpful to make this dependence
explicit by writing Evoffer(wr) .
The wage wr is called the reservation wage
and represents the lowest wage offer that an
unemployed worker will accept. As I will show
in the next section, the exact value of the reser-
vation wage depends on the wage offer distrib-
ution, the firing rate a, unemployment compen-
sation wu, and the discount factor b.
Solving for the
Reservation Wage
Next I briefly describe how to solve for the
value of the reservation wage. As shown in fig-
ure 1, the reservation wage wr is the value of w
which satisfies 
(6) vaccept(wr) = v wait
or, using equations (2) and (4),
(7)
wr + baEvoffer(wr)  
= wu + baEvoffer(wr)
1 – b(1 – a )
This expression says that the reservation wage
is the wage at which the value of accepting the
wage offer (the left side) is equal to the value
of rejecting the offer (the right side). That is,
the reservation wage is the wage at which the
worker is just indifferent between accepting or
rejecting the offer. Before we can solve this
equation for wr, we must first provide an
explicit expression for Evoffer (wr). 
Obtaining an expression for Evoffer (wr)
requires that I be explicit about the distribution
of wage offers that are contained in the wage
offer urn. Assume that these offers are uni-
formly distributed between w and w. This
implies that all wages between w and w are
equally likely to be drawn and makes the com-
putation of Evoffer (wr) straightforward. It is pro-
portional to the area under the voffer curve be-
tween w and w. After doing some algebra, one
finds that 
F I G U R E 1
Expected Lifetime Earnings
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(8) Evoffer (wr) = 1    2 3 4
where s = 1/(1 – b (1 – a)).
Using equation (8) to substitute Evoffer out of
equation (7), one obtains a single equation
containing wr: 
(9) wr = wu + 3 4
.
However, wr appears on both sides of this
equation, so a little more work is needed.
To simplify notation in what follows, define
a new function, 
(10) j(wr) º3 4          
,
which is the second term on the right side of
equation (9). This function can be interpreted as
the expected benefit of drawing a new wage
when the unemployed worker has an offer wr
in hand. Notice that this function is decreasing
in wr, which indicates that the expected gains
from drawing a new wage diminish as wr in-
creases. If wr is set to w, this function is 0, re-
flecting the fact there can be no gain from draw-
ing a new offer since w is the highest possible
wage. Equation (9) can be rewritten
(11) wr = wu + j(wr).
I have arrived at a single equation, (11),
which determines the value of the reservation
wage wr given values for all the parameters in
the model. The left side can be regarded as the
benefit of accepting a wage offer at the reserva-
tion wage. The more selective a person is (e.g.,
the higher her reservation wage), the higher the
value of accepting a job offer at the reservation
wage. Hence the left side of the equation is
increasing in wr. The right side can be regarded
as the value of rejecting the offer and waiting. It
includes the value of unemployment compensa-
tion w u plus the expected gain from drawing a
new age. The expected gain from receiving
additional wage offers again depends on how
selective the person is. The pickier she is, the
lower the chances of getting such an offer and
the lower the value of waiting. Thus the right
side is decreasing in wr. The equilibrium reser-
vation wage is the wage at which the benefit of
accepting is equal to the benefit of rejecting.
The next question to consider is whether a
unique value of wr exists which satisfies equa-
tion (11). Figure 2 graphs both sides of this
equation. Denote the left side, w, the “accept
curve,” and the right side, w u + j (w), the
“reject curve.’’ Since the accept curve is increas-
ing in w and the reject curve is decreasing in w,
the intersection of the two curves, if one exists,
will be unique. However, there may not exist
such a value. In this case the solution to the
problem will correspond to a reservation wage
of w (or lower) or to a reservation wage of w
(or higher). In any case, the functions voffer (×)
and v accept (×) and the constant v wait which
solve the problem are unique, as is the decision
rule for accepting and rejecting wage offers
within the set of possible wage offers. Figure 2
will be useful later when we discuss how
changes in various parameter values impact the
reservation wage.4
It is interesting to note that the reservation
wage behavior of the unemployed worker in
this model is observable in “real world” behav-
ior. Each week many unemployed workers
choose to continue their job searches even
though they could accept low-paying jobs at,
for instance, a local fast food restaurant. They
obviously do so with the expectation that they
will find a better job in the near future.
F I G U R E 2
Determination of the 
Reservation Wage
b(1 – a )     (w – wr)2
1 – b (1 – a)  2(w – w)
b(1 – a)       (w – wr)2
1 – b (1 – a)    2(w – w)
1
1 – b
w u + s( w – wr)2
2 (w – w)
n 4 Equation (9) is quadratic in w r, and the quadratic formula can be
used to directly solve for w r.
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Although this model abstracts from the behav-
ior of firms and the process by which the wage
distribution is determined, unemployment
durations and unemployment rates can be con-
structed nonetheless. First, assume that there
are many identical workers in the model who
act independently and have independent wage
offer draws when unemployed. Also assume
that the firing of employed workers occurs at
the end of each week. At the beginning of the
next week, each unemployed worker arrives at
a firm, receives a wage offer w, and decides
whether to accept or to reject that offer.
By setting the reservation wage wr relatively
high, the worker is less likely to receive an
acceptable wage offer and will, on average,
spend more time waiting for an acceptable
offer than if she set wr lower. The probability
of accepting a wage offer, called the job-
acceptance rate or the hazard rate, is simply
equal to the fraction of offers greater than or
equal to wr. Let y denote the job-acceptance
rate. Because the wage offer distribution is uni-
form, y is computed as 
(12) y =   .
The average number of weeks it takes to
receive an acceptable offer, referred to as the
average waiting time, is given by (1/y). Notice
that if wr is equal to w, the job-acceptance rate
is 0 and the average waiting time is infinity
since there is zero chance of drawing w from
the uniform distribution. If wr is equal to w,
the job acceptance rate is 1 and the average
waiting time is one week. That is, a job is al-
ways accepted in the first week upon becom-
ing unemployed.
Given the assumptions on the transition be-
tween employment and unemployment, the
average duration of unemployment is the av-
erage waiting time less one week, [(1/y) – 1].
So, for example, if the job-acceptance rate is 1,
then the average duration of unemployment 
is 0 weeks since all unemployed workers ex-
cept a job offer at the beginning of the week.
If the job-acceptance rate is 0.10, or one out of
10, then the average waiting time is 10 weeks
and the average duration of unemployment is
nine weeks.
The path of the unemployment rate through
time can be computed for any given initial
unemployment rate u1 as follows. Let ut be the
fraction of workers who are unemployed during
week t (the unemployment rate), and let L
denote the total population. Total unemploy-
ment is thus (Lut), while total employment is
(L – Lut). Given ut, we can compute ut + 1 by
keeping track of how many workers enter and
exit unemployment each week. This isex-
pressed as 
(13) Lut + 1 = Lut(1 – y) 
+ [(L – Lut)a (1 –y)].
This equation says that total unemployment
next week (Lut + 1) is equal to the number of
unemployed workers this week who do not ac-
cept a job at the start of next week [Lut (1 –y)],
plus the total number of employed workers this
week who are fired and do not accept a job at
the start of next week [(L – Lut)a(1 –y)]. This
equation can be rewritten by dividing through
by L and rearranging terms to get a simpler
expression for ut + 1, referred to as the law of
motion for ut:
(14) ut +1 = a(1 – y ) + [(1 – y)(1 – a)]ut.
Given any unemployment rate u1, equation
(14) can be used to compute the path of the
unemployment rate through time. One proper-
ty of this law of motion for ut is that the unem-
ployment rate converges to the same level for
any given initial unemployment rate u1. The
unemployment rate to which these paths con-
verge can be computed from equation (14) by
setting ut +1 = ut = us. Solving for us produces 
(15) us = 
a(1 – y )     .
a(1 – y ) + y
The value us is the steady state unemploy-
ment rate. It is the point at which the flow of
people into unemployment equals the flow of
workers out of unemployment, so that the un-
employment rate remains constant through time.
Notice that steady state unemployment de-
pends only upon the firing rate a and the job-
acceptance rate y. It is easy to show that higher
firing rates and lower job-acceptance rates each
imply higher unemployment rates, results which
match one’s intuition. Remember that while the
firing rate a was exogenously given (that is, giv-
en as a parameter and not part of the solution),
the job-acceptance rate y is endogenously de-
termined (that is, not given as a parameter but
part of the solution) and depends on all the
parameters in the model. Thus, through y the
steady state unemployment depends on all the
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At this point let me briefly return to two
points raised in the introduction. First, notice
that unemployment in this model arises solely
from incomplete information about wages and
jobs that is costly to acquire; unemployment
here is not a disequilibrium phenomena. Unem-
ployment occurs even though all workers be-
have optimally and results from the costly but
socially beneficial activity of achieving good
matches between workers and jobs. Second, 
the model illustrates that distinctions between
voluntary and involuntary unemployment are
unclear and not useful. Here unemployment is
voluntary in the sense that workers choose to
reject wage offers. But unemployment is invol-
untary in the sense that any unemployed work-
er (whom we know has only received wage
offers less than wr) would prefer to switch
places with any employed worker (who is re-
ceiving a wage of wr or larger).
II. A Numerical
Example
In order to make the insights provided by this
model concrete, it is helpful to work with a
numerical example. Consider a distribution of
wage offers that is uniform between 200 and
800. This means that an unemployed worker is
equally likely to receive any wage offer be-
tween $200 and $800 per week, and implies an
average wage offer of $500. Let the firing rate 
a be 0.005, or 1/2 percent per week, and the
discount rate b equal 0.999, which corresponds
to a 5 percent annual real interest rate. Lastly,
set unemployment compensation w u to $200.
After solving the model for these parameter val-
ues, I will discuss how the reservation wage,
the average duration of unemployment, and the
unemployment rate respond to changes in
these values.
Take a guess at what the reservation wage is
for this example. Will the worker hold out for a
wage greater than $500, the average wage offer?
The answer is yes. In fact, the reservation wage
wr is $737.62. If you think this number is sur-
prisingly large, consider the fact that with a fir-
ing rate a of 0.005, the average length of em-
ployment, which is given by 1/a , is 200 weeks
or almost four years. This means that once a
wage offer is accepted, the worker expects to
receive that wage for the next four years—thus
providing an incentive to hold out for a rela-
tively high wage. Of course, every week an of-
fer is rejected is a week with foregone wage in-
come, so the worker doesn’t hold out for $800.
The job-acceptance rate for this example is
equal to 0.104. This says that each week there
is a 10.4 percent chance of receiving an accept-
able wage offer—which is any wage greater
than or equal to $737.62. This job-acceptance
rate implies an average duration of unemploy-
ment of 8.6 weeks.
Finally, the steady state unemployment rate
is 0.041, or 4.1 percent. Figure 3 illustrates the
time paths for two different initial unemploy-
ment rates, 7.1 percent and 1.1 percent. Each of
these paths converges to the steady state rate of
0.041. As discussed in the previous section, this
convergence to steady state occurs for any ini-
tial unemployment rate.
What causes the unemployment rate to be
above or below the steady rate in the first
period? Loosely speaking, one could imagine
that a one-time unexpected shock hits the
economy which changes the unemployment
rate. For example, this could reflect a tempo-
rary increase (decrease) in the wage offer distri-
bution, perhaps due to a productivity shock,
which implies that more (fewer) wage offers
are above (below) the reservation wage and
thereby lowering (increasing) unemployment.
After this temporary shift, the wage offer distri-
bution returns to its original form, and the
unemployment rate steadily returns to its steady
state value. Throughout the remainder of this
paper, I will focus on the determinants of the
steady state unemployment rate.
F I G U R E 3
Unemployment Paths
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While the model presented here is relatively
stark and simple, it nonetheless provides inter-
esting insights on how elements of the eco-
nomic environment influence the unemploy-
ment rate. In the following subsections I
explore how changes in the discount rate, firing
rate, wage offer distribution, and unemploy-
ment compensation each influence the solution
to the numerical example. For each of these
elements I first examine the effect on the reser-
vation wage, then trace the effects on the aver-




First consider the effect of an increase in the
real interest rate, which implies a lower val-
ue for the discount factor b (recall that b =
1/(1+ r)). It is not immediately obvious how
this change will effect the reservation wage or
the unemployment rate. However, intuition
suggests that because a higher interest rate im-
plies discounting future earnings more rapidly,
an increase in the real interest rate lowers the
benefits of waiting for a higher wage. This sug-
gests that the reservation wage will decrease.
Indeed, figure 4a shows that a higher interest
rate causes the reject curve to shift inward, re-
sulting in a lower reservation wage.
The lower reservation wage implies a higher
job-acceptance rate, lower unemployment dura-
tion, and lower steady state unemployment.
That is, higher real interest rates lead to lower
steady state unemployment. It is informative to
consider extreme cases to gain insight into the
underlying logic of the model. For example,
consider setting the real interest rate infinitely
large, which corresponds to setting b to 0. In
this case the worker completely discounts future
earnings. Thus, she sets her reservation wage to
$200, accepts any job offer, and the unemploy-
ment rate is 0. Unemployment in the model is
due, in part, to workers’ willingness to wait for
a high wage offer.
Figure 4b shows how the reservation wage
and unemployment rate vary with the real
interest rate. Both are steadily decreasing in the
interest rate. As the interest rate approaches 0
(the case in which workers do not discount the
future at all), the reservation wage and the
unemployment rate increase to $743 and 4.5
percent, respectively.
F I G U R E 4 A
Effect of Higher Real 
Interest Rate
u
F I G U R E 4 B
Effect of Changes in the 
Real Interest Rate
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Changes in 
the Firing Rate
Next suppose there is an exogenous increase
in the firing rate a, perhaps resulting from a
change in government regulations. While the
effect on the reservation wage may not be
apparent in this case, it seems obvious that an
increase in the firing rate must result in an
increase in the unemployment rate. Figure 5a
illustrates that an increase in a causes the reject
curve to shift inward toward 0. This results in a
decrease in the reservation wage and a corre-
sponding increase in the job-acceptance rate.
This finding is not particularly surprising since,
all things being equal, an increase in the firing
rate reduces the expected length of time at a
given job, and thus reduces the benefit of wait-
ing for a relatively high wage offer. For exam-
ple, if you are likely to hold the same job for
only a few months, then it is not worth spend-
ing a long time searching for a high wage job.
Surprisingly, the effect of an increase in the
firing rate on the unemployment rate is
ambiguous and depends on the size of the
increase. Figure 5b shows that the unemploy-
ment rate increases steadily as the firing rate
rises to roughly 0.30, but then declines for
higher firing rates. To understand why this
occurs, note that the reservation wage falls as
the firing rate rises. This implies that the job-
acceptance rate is increasing with a and the
average duration of unemployment is falling.
Thus there are two competing effects on
the steady state unemployment rate.The in-
crease in the firing rate raises unemployment,
while the increase in the job-acceptance rate
lowers unemployment. Which effect domi-
nates depends upon the specific numerical
values used in the example and the magnitude
of the increase in the firing rate. In the ex-
treme case where all workers are fired every
period (a = 1), unemployed workers accept all
wage offers (wr = 200) and the unemployment
rate is 0. The average weekly wage that work-
ers receive falls from $737.62 when the unem-
ployment rate is 4.1 percent, to $500 when the
unemployment rate is 0; meanwhile, the ex-
pected lifetime earnings, Evoffer, of an unem-
ployed worker fall from $740,086 to $500,000.
This example makes clear that policies which
reduce unemployment do not necessarily
benefit workers.
The potential for such surprising effects is
one reason that it is important to rigorously
model economic behavior. While intuition is
certainly useful as a guide, relying on intuition
alone often provides an incomplete picture,
and is sometimes just plain wrong.
F I G U R E 5 A
Effect of Higher Firing Rate
a
F I G U R E 5 B
Effect of Changes 
in the Firing Rate
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Changes in the Wage
Offer Distribution
Next I address the impact of changes in the
wage offer distribution. More specifically, I
examine the effect of a permanent upward shift
in the entire wage offer distribution, perhaps
resulting from a permanent increase in produc-
tivity, and the effect of an increase in the “riski-
ness’’ of the wage offer distribution.
An Upward Shift in
the Distribution
Suppose that the distribution of wages were to
increase by the fraction l , or l times 100 per-
cent, as the result of a permanent, across-the-
board increase in productivity. This implies that
the uniform distribution of wage offers shifts
from [200,800] to [200(1 + l) , 800(1 + l)].
Consider two cases. First, suppose that
unemployment compensation, w u, increases
by the same percentage as all the wage offers.
Equation (9), which determines the reservation
wage, could then be rewritten 
(16) wr¢ = (1 + l)wu + 3 4
3
2(( 1 + l)w – ( 1 + l) w) 
,
where wr¢ is the reservation wage given the
new wage offer distribution. With a little bit of
algebra, it is straightforward to show that 
wr¢ = (1 + l)w r.
That is, the reservation wage increases by the
same percentage as the wage offers.
Next consider what happens to the job-
acceptance rate, y ¢, which is determined by
(17) y ¢ = 
The job-acceptance rate is unaffected by the
shift in the wage offer distribution. This implies
that the average duration of unemployment and
the unemployment rate are also unchanged!
While this result is certainly a striking one, it
is perhaps not so surprising. It essentially says
that if the costs and benefits of searching for a
job all go up by the same proportion, then the
reservation wage will increase by the same pro-
portion and unemployment will be unaffected.
Consider an example where we simply measure
the wage offer distribution and unemployment
compensation in cents instead of in dollars.
Clearly we would expect the reservation wage
to increase from $737.62 to 73,762 cents, with
unemployment duration and rates unaffected.
Now consider a second case. Suppose that
unemployment compensation does not increase
with the wage distribution. Figure 6 shows that
in this case the reservation wage increases less
than proportionally with the wage offer distribu-
tion (wr¢/(1 + l) < wr). This implies that the
job-acceptance rate increases, unemployment
duration falls, and the unemployment rate de-
clines. The relative cost of searching increases
since unemployment compensation, which
serves as a subsidy to searching, does not in-
crease with the wage distribution.
As an example, consider a 5 percent in-
crease in the wage distribution, so that l equals
0.05. For this case the reservation wage in-
creases by 4.9 percent to $773.96, and the
unemployment rate falls slightly, from 4.13 per-
cent to 4.09 percent. For this particular exam-
ple, the 5 percent increase in the wage offer
distribution has little impact on unemployment.
b(1 – a)




F I G U R E 6
Effect of Changes in the
Mean of Wage Distribution
((1 + l ) w – wr¢)2
(1 + l) w – (1 + l) wr
=
w – wr
(1 + l) w – (1 + l) w w – w = y.
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Next I examine the effect of a change in the
“riskiness’’ of the wage offer distribution. To do
this, I must first clarify what I mean by riskiness.
I define riskiness as the difference between
the highest and lowest possible wage offers, 
(w – w). An increase (decrease) in riskiness will
be defined as an increase (decrease) in this
spread which does not affect the mean. Define
the lower and upper bounds on wage offers 
to be 500 – d/2 and 500 + d/2, where 0 £ d £
$1000. Thus d is the measure of riskiness since
(d = w – w), and was set equal to 600 in the
baseline numerical example. Notice that the
mean of the distribution is 500 regardless of the
value of d. When d is set to zero, there is no
riskiness in wage offers in the sense that all
wage offers are exactly $500.
What happens to the reservation wage and
the unemployment rate as the riskiness of the
distribution changes? Figure 7a shows that the
reservation wage increases with wage offer risk-
iness. This is not too surprising, given that the
spread of the distribution is increasing. Further-
more, the job-acceptance rate decreases as riski-
ness increases, which implies that the unem-
ployment rate rises. This seems to bear out the
intuition that riskiness is bad for workers.
Before reaching that conclusion, however,
consider the case in which there is no riskiness
(d = 0). Since there is no uncertainty in wage
offers, there is no reason to search. Each job
pays $500, and workers who are unemployed
at the beginning of the week always accept the
offer. The steady state unemployment rate in
this case is 0. But is an unemployed worker
better off?
Let’s compare the expected discounted life-
time earnings, Evoffer, for an unemployed
worker first in the model with no riskiness, and
then in the baseline numerical example with
riskiness (d = 600). In the case with no riski-
ness, Evoffer is slightly less than $500,000, the
present value of $500 per week forever (with
no unemployment spells). But in the case with
riskiness, Evoffer is $740,086.
At first blush it may seem surprising that an
unemployed worker in the model with wage
riskiness and higher unemployment has sub-
stantially higher expected lifetime earnings than
an unemployed worker in the model with no
riskiness and no unemployment. But it should
not be. Given that the average duration of a job
is almost four years, an unemployed worker
would be much better off spending more time
searching for a relatively high-paying job than
she would be in a world where all jobs paid the
average wage. Recall that the reservation wage
in our numerical example was $737.62, which
is almost 50 percent higher than the average
wage offer of $500. Figure 7b shows that ex-
pected lifetime earnings steadily increase as the
spread in the wage distribution increases. Here,
d
F I G U R E 7 A
Effect of Changes in the
Variance of Wage Distribution
d
F I G U R E 7 B
Effect of Changes in Wage Riskiness
on Expected Lifetime Earnings
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q313
riskiness is good. Again, note that versions of
the model with low unemployment are not





Finally, consider what happens when unem-
ployment compensation is increased. Figure 8a
shows that an increase in unemployment com-
pensation causes the reject curve to shift out-
ward, implying an increase in the reservation
wage. This is not surprising: Since unemploy-
ment compensation acts as a subsidy to search-
ing, the worker is willing to wait longer for a
high-paying job and thus increases her reserva-
tion wage.
The higher reservation wage implies a
lower job-acceptance rate, an increase in the
average duration of unemployment, and an
increase in the unemployment rate. Figure 8b
shows that the reservation wage and the un-
employment rate increase steadily with in-
creases in unemployment compensation. In
the extreme case where w u is set to 800, it is
clear that unemployment will be 100 percent
since no job pays better than collecting unem-
ployment compensation.
Consider an increase in wu from $200 to
$300 per week. In this case the reservation
wage increases from $737.62 to $743.35, aver-
age unemployment duration increases from 8.6
weeks to 9.6 weeks, and the unemployment
rate increases from 4.1 percent to 4.6 percent.
There is a great deal of empirical evidence
which supports the finding that increases in
unemployment compensation result in higher
unemployment. This does not imply that unem-
ployment insurance necessarily makes workers
worse off in the real world. The findings do
suggest, though, that a tension exists between
maintaining low unemployment rates and pro-
viding insurance for the unemployed.
III. Concluding
Remarks
Search models of unemployment provide a
valuable tool for understanding the factors
which determine the unemployment rate and
the impact of labor market policies and regula-
tions on unemployment. Furthermore, search
theory provides an alternative perspective to
the view that unemployment represents idle
resources. In this theory unemployed workers
F I G U R E 8 A
Effect of Higher Unemployment 
Compensation
F I G U R E 8 B
Effect of Changes in 
Unemployment Compensation
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are not idle, but instead are engaging in the
socially beneficial activity of finding a produc-
tive job match. The simple version presented
in this paper illustrates how search models can
be used to examine the influence of elements
of the economic environment on the unem-
ployment rate.
The search model discussed here is often
referred to as a one-sided search model be-
cause it focuses solely on the job decisions of
unemployed workers and abstracts from the
search decisions of firms. More complex two-
sided search models examine the optimizing
decisions of workers and firms simultaneously.
In addition, these models have incorporated a
variety of other considerations which are
abstracted from in the simple model, and they
have proven to be capable of explaining many
features of unemployment data within and
across countries. This process of building better
theories is perhaps the most important step in
designing good economic policies, and search
theory is playing a critical role in that process.
Appendix 
Solving the Model
In this appendix I lay out the basic mathemati-
cal structure of the model and describe a strate-
gy for solving it. The wage offers in each period
are drawn from the same wage distribution
F(w), where F denotes the cumulative distribu-
tion function. That is, F (
Ù w) = prob(w  £ 
Ù w).
The definition of Evoffer, the expected value of
the voffer value function, is
(A1) Evoffer = òw
wvoffer(w¢)dF (w¢).
The Bellman functional equation for voffer  is
written






1 – b(1 – a)
where the first term is the value of waiting and
the second term is the value of accepting the
wage offer. The equation determining the reser-
vation wage wr is 
(A3)
wr + baEvoffer(wr)
1 – b(1 – a)
which can be rewritten
(A4) wr = c[1 – b (1 – a)] 
+ [b(1 – b )(1 – a)Evoffer (wr)]. 
Assuming a uniform distribution for F makes
it possible to obtain a closed form solution for
the integral expression that defines Evoffer. This
integral can be rewritten 
(A5) Evoffer  =òw
wvoffer (w ¢)dF(w¢)
=  ò w
wvoffer (w¢)dw¢
using the fact that the density function for a
uniform distribution on [w, w] is 1/(w – w).
This latter integral is simply the area under the
v offer curve, whose shape is illustrated in figure
1. This integral can be written 
(A6) òw
wvoffer (w¢)dw¢ =
v wait (w – w) 
+   (w – wr)s(w – wr)
where s = 1/(1 – b(1 – a)) is the slope of
vaccept. The first term is the area of the rectangle
with width (w – w) and height vwait, and the
second term is the area of the triangle with
width (w – wr) and height s(w – wr). Note,
however, that this expression is still a function
of Evoffer since v wait equals (wu + bEvoffer ).
Substituting equation (A6) and the definition
of v wait into equation (A5), one obtains 
(A7) Evoffer(wr)= 1 2
33 (wu+bEvoffer(wr))(w –w) 
+  (w – wr)s(w – wr)4
= wu +bEvoffer (wr) 
+  .
This expression can be rewritten to obtain
Evoffer as a function of wr
(A8) Evoffer (wr) =1 2 3wu + 4.
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Finally, this expression for Evoffer can be
combined with (A4) to obtain an equation in
wr alone: 
(A9) wr = wu +1 21 2.
This is a quadratic equation in wr. It can be
shown that the smaller of the two roots for this
expression is the equilibrium reservation wage
if the solution is interior (w < w <  w ). Given
wr, equation (A8) can be used to obtain Evoffer,
which in turn can be used to obtain v wait,
v accept, and voffer using equations (2), (4), and
(5) in the text.
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